The objective of this course is to enable students to model static and dynamic strategic interactions under complete and incomplete information using advanced game-theoretic methodologies, and to analytically solve strategic decision-making processes through core solution concepts (Nash Equilibrium, Subgame Perfect Equilibrium, Bayesian Nash Equilibrium, and Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium). Additionally, the course aims to equip students with the skills to independently analyze game-theoretic models in economic literature and apply them to their own research by critically evaluating foundational mechanisms such as auctions, signaling, cheap talk, and bargaining, alongside evolutionary and behavioral game theory approaches.

This course provides a comprehensive examination of the theoretical framework, mathematical foundations, and strategic solution concepts of game theory at the graduate level. Focusing heavily on modeling strategic interactions in game form, the curriculum covers static and dynamic games under both complete and incomplete information, analytically deciphering the equilibrium mechanisms within these structures. Throughout the semester, alongside foundational game-theoretic applications such as repeated games, auction theory, signaling games, cheap talk, and sequential bargaining models, the course explores evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) and behavioral game theory literature that relax classical rationality assumptions. By the end of the term, students will acquire the capacity to independently analyze complex game-theoretic models in economic literature and construct original strategic models for their own academic research.